www.tor.org, right?
www.tor.gov, right?
www.tor.edu, right?
www.torproject.org! Right? :)No Thanks.
The leash is getting shorter, paving the way for authoritarianism.
If it works the way they promote, isn’t it a good middle way and alternative to other options? If it is open source, we can check it how it really works. My opinion at the moment is, that they try better than a lot of others.
So this way a service the user wants to use could set automatically to child protected besides this app delivers a prove for more. This way also the big tech player could set into responsible way without collecting all your data to know if you are old enough?
I understand that also a education for all internet users is necessary and still a partly regulation of the big tech and others. I’m surprised that EU is going this router and really happy that it does not sounds like a surveillance system.
Any other Ideas how to solve the age check problem nowadays? And move the whole responsibility to the parents does not help. Also parents need help with all the stuff around to protect their children.
Where are all those parents who should protect their kids? Does they even know what their kids are doing? Or do they even care?
They’ve already found several security flaws: https://lemmy.world/post/45676911
Who’s running the background here?
There isn’t one. Local, on-device zero knowledge proof in a cross-platform OSS app. You scan your ID’s NFC tag, once. Site only gets “is over 18 y/n” info. We all already have these IDs and they are used for a bunch of stuff, from doing taxes to creating bank accounts.
So when the site got “is under 18” yesterday and “is over 18” today, they now know your birthday. Cool.
Still doesn’t know you name, location, sex, and every other verifiable metric.
And your plan only works once in a blue moon (literally).
The site can not request the information by itself, so you would have to actively do this procedure by yourself. And why would you try to send a certificate if you are under 18. And this trick only works once in a lifetime only on website that track you in a way (the certificate is not able to be used to track you, afaik not even across individual usages, so if you use a porn website every day and have to send a new certificate every day it’s not able to track you).
No. As the other person said. The answers to the zkp do not refer to each other. All the site knows is SOME user was not 18 yesterday, and today SOME user is 18 (or 24… or 89…). No relation between the two zkps/certs.
Browser fingerprinting is a thing, though. The site already know who you are. This doesn’t really change anything.
An american company, probably
Because the easiest argument against tech giants is “they hurt children”. If the tech giants can ‘prove’ they don’t serve children the argument is gone. So the techs are lobbying for age verification. They don’t even care if it works, when it is not their responsibility. Of course the problem is not about the kids only, but the whole business model based on advertising, data collection and manipulative algorithms. But it is easier and better for business to age verify and ‘ban social media for kids’ than to fix actual problems.
I’m kind of surprised they’re actually going through with the zero-knowledge proof setup. This is pretty much the only method I find mostly acceptable for stuff like this tbh.
which would work on any device
This part seems unlikely. It’ll work on “most” devices but if you’re running something weird like a Linux phone I doubt it’ll work (although since it’s open-source I guess someone could potentially add support).
It doesn’t seem very sensible to me. The specs say that a ZKP proof “should” be used.
Basically, you get a token from some source that knows your age and identity, such as the government. You pass this token on to some other entity that wants to know if you are above a certain age.
If both of these parties record the tokens they send and receive, then your browsing history can be tied to your identity. Realistically, this would only happen if the government wants it.
Using ZKP, you could prove that you have a valid token, without disclosing the details. But if the government decides that the tokens have to be recorded, then sites simply would not accept the ZKP.
I think one could also make a more subtle and limited attack by issuing special tokens. Say, someone’s accused of being a terrorist, or violating copyright. Then they could be issued a special token which instructs receivers to record their activity and forward it to the police.
Hm, I’m reading the spec. It seems more simplistic than I was expecting.
Issuance of Proof of Age attestations (step 3)
Once the User’s age has been verified, the AP may either issue the Proof of Age attestation directly to the User’s AVI or generate a pre-authorized code and provide it to the User as part of a credential offer. At a later stage, the User can present this credential offer through their AVI to obtain the Proof of Age attestation.
Confirmation and presentation (step 5)
The AVI receives the Proof of Age request and presents it to the User. The User reviews the request details, verifies the information, and confirms the transaction to proceed.
The AVI securely transmits the Proof of Age attestation to the RP.
Guess it does just pass the attestation around.
2.2.3 Revocation and Re-Issuance In its current form, the solution does not support revocation or re-issuance. Adding support for these features would introduce additional complexity, which could hinder the rapid adoption of the solution.
The attestation is ideally only used once and issued in batches, so this is both good and bad I guess, since if they ask to track you and they haven’t already recorded all the attestations, they’ll need to wait for you to generate more.
Unlinkability: The goal of the solution is to prevent user profiling and tracking by avoiding linkable transactions. Initially, the solution will rely on batch issuance to protect users from colluding RPs. Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) mechanisms will be considered to offer protection. More details are provided in Section 7.
Basically a big TBD. Lovely.
The more subtle attack you mention could probably be avoided if the root certs and so on or whatever equivalent they’re using are public and you check that the attestation given to you doesn’t include extraneous details (which ideally the app would do for you). Not sure how that’ll interact with the zkSNARK solution provided as an “experimental feature.”
It doesn’t really matter though since they can just record the attestations when they’re issued, so they just have to say “look for these attestations” to whatever site and they can track your visits.
It is recommended that the Proof of Age attestation be designed as a single-use credential and remain valid for a maximum period of three (3) months from the date of issuance. If a revocation mechanism is required, a status list may be utilized as an effective solution for managing the revocation status of attestations.
Of course, using it in batches is only “recommended,” so I guess they could just issue it once and continuously reuse it, in which case it would be very easy for websites to link it to you.
There’s probably more I could pull out, but yeah, doesn’t seem great based on the spec :|
Yeah as far as i am aware, there is no such thing as zero-knowledge proof in practice for this kind of thing. If there are “bad actors” in other words “the police” with access to both the government database and (through a warrant or backdoor) the websites data, then the whole anonymization is gone. Its a sandcastle concept and an attempt to trick the population by making it sound fancy when its not at all.
ZKP has a specific meaning in cryptography. In fairness, it does a little here. But yes, it is basically a marketing term. Like “blockchain” or whatever.
Eventually, the idea here is to divide the population into 2 classes, one of which is to be denied access to certain information or services. If privacy is the only potential problem one sees with that, then… well…
Well yeah the inherent absurdity of age verification itself is a whole separate topic, but i think that battle is already kind of lost sadly. Our societies are so overobsessed with safety, there is no way they will not fall for the whole protect the children shtick.
Ursula von der Leyen says it is “completely anonymous” and that it is tied to one’s passport or ID card. The technical details of how this apparent contradiction is resolved do not seem to be available.
I wonder if it will be as shitty as its various predecessors.
